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Abstract—The advent of next-generation sequencing (NGS)
machines made DNA sequencing cheaper, but also put pressure
on the genomic life-cycle, which includes aligning millions of short
DNA sequences, called reads, to a reference genome. On the
performance side, efficient algorithms have been developed, and
parallelized on public clouds. On the privacy side, since genomic
data are utterly sensitive, several cryptographic mechanisms have
been proposed to align reads more securely than the former, but
with a lower performance. This manuscript presents DNA-SeAl
a novel contribution to improving the privacy × performance
product in current genomic workflows. First, building on recent
works that argue that genomic data needs to be treated according
to a threat-risk analysis, we introduce a multi-level sensitivity
classification of genomic variations designed to prevent the
amplification of possible privacy attacks. We show that the usage
of sensitivity levels reduces future re-identification risks, and that
their partitioning helps prevent linkage attacks. Second, after
extending this classification to reads, we show how to align and
store reads using different security levels. To do so, DNA-SeAl
extends a recent reads filter to classify unaligned reads into
sensitivity levels, and adapts existing alignment algorithms to
the reads sensitivity. We show that using DNA-SeAl allows high
performance gains whilst enforcing high privacy levels in hybrid
cloud environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
DNA sequencing and the alignment of sequences are at
the heart of applications such as precision medicine, forensics,
medical or anthropological research [1], [2], to name a few.
Next-generation sequencing (NGS) machines greatly improved
the throughput of human DNA sequencing and thereby reduced
the costs of DNA analysis to almost 1000$ per genome. Widely
deployed sequencing machines (e.g., from Roche or Illumina)
produce short sequences of nucleotides ranging from 30 to 100
base pairs (bp) with error rates around 0.1% [3]. A simplified
genomic workflow can be presented as follows. First, the raw
sequences of nucleotides that sequencing machines produce,
called reads, are aligned to a reference genome to obtain their
location in the genome. Then, aligned reads are used as input
of the variant calling step, which identifies the donor’s genomic
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variations (i.e., her/his genotype). Finally, subsequent research
or medical applications compare a subject’s genotype with
other genotypes, or simply study it at a given locus.
On the one hand, data leaks threaten the privacy of human
genomes. For example, not only do genomes uniquely identify
their owner but they also reveal information about his/her rela-
tives. In addition, once a genome has been revealed, its privacy
cannot be recovered, as a subject’s genome barely evolves
during his life. As multiple studies have shown, anonymizing
human genomes, or creating aggregates, cannot fully enforce
privacy. To name a few, published privacy attacks included
re-identification attacks [4], and disease-revealing attacks [5].
It has also been shown that leaking raw reads can expose
their donors to data identity leakage [6]. Consequently, besides
standard encryption-based solutions, several works have been
published to protect the advanced uses of genomic data:
masking information in aligned reads [7], creating privacy-
preserving releases of aggregated data [8], classifying raw
genomic data as sensitive or non-sensitive [9].
On the other hand, efficient workflows are required, due
to the decrease of the sequencing prices that has led to
larger data productions and processing workloads. Anticipating
this, several works [10]–[12] argued for distributed and high-
performance environments to host genomic workflows. Global
Alliance [13] developed an ecosystem of worldwide databases
that can be remotely accessed. Despite these efforts, patient-
derived health data are not widely shared [14]. Recently, sev-
eral ecosystems addressing the privacy and performance chal-
lenges of accessing genomic data in the cloud have been de-
veloped. For example, NGS-Logistics [15] allows researchers
to analyze rare genomic variants while preserving the privacy
of donors. In particular, it relies on different levels of access
rights for better protection of the data. However, concerning
the processing of genomic data, scientist are considering the
use of clouds [16], even though practical privacy-preserving
processing of early genomic data has not been defined.
To summarize, privacy attacks on genomic data alerted
about the need to incorporate security measures into existing
genomic workflows. However, existing cryptographic solutions
cannot sustain the high throughput of modern sequencers. Con-
sequently, the status quo is still to rely on plaintext methods,
preferentially on private clouds but also on public clouds,
such as Amazon AWS1. For genomic processing workflows to
rely on the cheap, widely available and highly efficient public
clouds, there is a need for mechanisms that establish a stronger
balance between privacy and performance. Indeed, bullet-proof
security does not exist, and public clouds may suffer from data
leaks caused by internal or external adversaries [17], [18].
1See https://aws.amazon.com/solutions/case-studies/illumina/.
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In this work, we focus on protecting sensitive genomic
data as soon as they are produced by an NGS machine,
i.e., before the genomic variations they contain have been
determined, and continue to do so throughout the alignment
step. As previous works [15] argued, classifying genomic data
as either sensitive or not sensitive at all is not sufficient. Some
studies support the need for sensitivity degree classifications
for genomic and clinical data [19]. Building on this fact,
we remarked that a finer grained sensitivity classification
of raw reads combined with alignment algorithms that have
different privacy guarantees and efficiencies, has the potential
to improve the performance and overall privacy of alignment.
As such, DNA-SeAl makes the following contributions:
• We present a classification of raw reads into sensitivity
levels, based on qualitative and quantitative characteristics of
genomic variations. These sensitivity levels are then further
partitioned in such a way that an adversary observing a part
of the reads of a given sensitivity level, thanks to a successful
attack, is not able to infer any more sensitive information
from it. We disconnect sensitivity levels, based on the linkage
disequilibrium (LD) of genomic variations, and on MaCH [20],
a state-of-the-art haplotype inference software.
• Building on previous work, namely [9], we propose to use a
detection method based on Bloom Filters (BFs) to efficiently
classify raw reads into partitions of sensitivity levels. In
particular, we show how to preserve the disconnection property
of sensitivity levels when Bloom filters produce false positives
among the same or different sensitivity levels.
• We show that given a realistic heterogeneous and distributed
environment, one can rely on the diversity of the existing
alignment procedures to optimize the privacy × performance
product of the read alignment step.
Whenever a public cloud is available, and is at least
as powerful as the private infrastructure, our performance
evaluation shows that DNA-SeAl requires on average 0.29 CPU
seconds and only 1.6 KB of data transfer to securely align
a read. Compared to a exclusive public cloud approach, this
represents a 106-fold reduction of the computing time and 107-
fold reduction of the amount of data transferred to the cloud.
Related Works
The publication of privacy attacks [6], [21] and the use
of public cloud environments for biomedical data analysis has
raised security concerns. The most widely known privacy at-
tacks perform re-identification of donors, relying on inference
techniques and different kinds of personal information [4], [5].
It has also been shown that partial genomic data leaks may
enable trail attacks [22], which identify an individual thanks
to his unique distinguishing features.
Protecting biomedical data is now a priority challenge
for the biomedical community [23]. In order to address this
challenge, the biomedical community invested on strategies to
protect genomic data privacy and defined three categories of
protection: data de-identification [22], data augmentation [24],
and cryptographic-based methods [25]. Data de-identification
methods remove personal identifiers, such as names and
social security numbers, from genomic data, for example
through pseudonymization [26]. However, these methods used
alone have been shown not to be sufficient to prevent re-
identification attacks [22]. Second, data augmentation methods
rely on generalization to achieve privacy protection, basically
making records more similar to each other. These methods
achieve protection at the price of a lower data utility. Finally,
cryptographic-based methods allow users to maintain data
utility while protecting the data privacy [25], but they are of
limited applicability.
Efficient plaintext alignment methods have been devel-
oped, and can be used in parallel in public clouds (either
with or without encrypting the data transfers) to study large
amounts of data. However, these highly optimized methods,
which include CloudBurst [27] and DistMap [28], are not
privacy-preserving. Secure alignment algorithms have also
been developed, for example using garbled circuits [29] or
homomorphic encryption schemes [30], however, they suffer
from poor performance. Finally, recently, researchers have
been searching for approaches that combine high performance
and privacy. Chen et al. [31] proposed a seed-and-extend
alignment method, where the seeding step is executed in a
public cloud based on keyed-hashes, and the extension step
runs in a private cloud. Differently, Balaur [32] makes use of
Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH), secure k-mer voting, and
a MinHash algorithm, and Maskal [33] relies on a read filter
and Intel SGX enclaves.
Ayday et al. [7] proposed to store encrypted reads in a
biobank that enables classified people (e.g., data analyst in a
hospital) to retrieve a subset of the reads from a biobank to
perform genetic tests while keeping the nature of the tests
private. In this approach, the biobank masks parts of the
reads, for example, those located outside the request range,
or those that the patient did not agree to share. Filtering
approaches that identify potential genomic variations at the
reads or at the nucleotides level have been described [9],
[34]. However, contrary to DNA-SeAl, those approaches do
not support sensitivity levels. Concurring with our position, of
classifying genomic data into sensitivity levels, Dyke et al. [19]
proposed a Data Sharing Privacy Test to distinguish degrees
of sensitivity for the GA4GH Beacon Project to facilitate data
sharing.
Several works [35], [36] determined panels of less than
100 common SNPs, which are sufficient to uniquely identify
a subject with very high probability. These panels are often
population specific, and made of SNPs carefully selected, for
example, based on their minor allele frequency, or linkage
disequilibrium (LD). Our method is particularly effective in
this situation, where there is an obvious and known sensitivity
differential. Considering the inevitable risk residing in use of
public clouds, and given the purpose of reducing the risk as
much as possible, we introduce a methodology which can be
parameterized by: (i) protecting the collections of SNPs that
reveal the most information, to a higher standard; (ii) further
including the SNPs used in those critical panels in the highest
sensitivity levels, to further complicate re-identification.
II. METHODS
A. Data, system and threat model
Data. We build the sensitivity levels based on the genomes
of the 1000 Genomes Project [37], and recombine genomic
variations with the reference genome GRCh38.p11 to create
sensitive sequences that are used to initialize read filters [9],
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and classify reads into sensitivity levels. We analyse the
sensitivity of reads of 100 and 1,000 bases. These two lengths
were selected as representative lengths for short and long reads,
accordingly to the existing sequencing machines [38]. We also
evaluate the genomic privacy metric on the sensitivity levels
using genomes from the 1000 Genomes Project. To study
linkage risks, we measure Likelihood Ratio values based on
the 2017 iDASH contest dataset2, which contains vcf files
for 1,000 case and 1,000 control individuals, with 5,511,698
distinct SNPs from chromosome 1.
System model. We consider a biocenter whose task is to
generate reads from an individual, and to align those reads
to a reference genome in a privacy-preserving manner. To do
so, the biocenter can rely on a private cloud, and on several
public clouds, which receive an equal random proportion of
the reads contained in a sensitivity level. We assume that the
sequencing machine and the private cloud are secure. However,
we consider a private cloud expensive to maintain, which
encourages the use of public clouds even though we assume
that the user does not have a complete control over its own data
(i.e., which machines are used, etc.) in public clouds. Finally,
we consider that all parties rely on encrypted communications.
Threat model. We assume an honest-but-curious adver-
sary, who tries to observe sensitive genomic information during
the alignment of reads. In particular, the adversary is able
to observe raw reads in the public cloud if they are used
in plaintext alignment algorithms. However, we assume that
no more than f = 1 public clouds can be compromised,
so that privacy guarantees increase with N/f , where N is
the total number of clouds used. We also assume that the
adversary has access to a reference genome, is able to align
raw reads to obtain the biological insights they contain, and
has access to the statistical relationships between genomic
variations. Obtaining such refined data can then potentially
enable existing privacy attacks during future uses of data
(e.g., if allele frequencies in a case population are publicly
released). To limit the risk that an adversary obtains sensitive
information, while obtaining high performance using cleartext
alignment, we use a risk-threat approach to protect the reads.
Privacy goals and amplification attack. In addition, as
perfect security does not exist, in case a successful attack
happens, where an adversary would be able to observe raw
reads, DNA-SeAl aims at preventing this attack from being
extended to data that could not be observed directly during
the attack (e.g., because it is more protected, or used in a
different location). We call this an amplification attack. First,
the possible presence of a rare allele for a given locus cannot
be inferred from the observation of a single common allele
in a compromised cloud, since at most one public cloud is
assumed to be compromised, and could therefore host a second
common allele. Then, we use Linkage Disequilibrium (LD)
measurements, and MaCH [20], a state-of-the-art haplotype
inference software, to make sure that an adversary is never able
to execute such amplification attacks. Overall, our approach
complicates future re-identification attacks, since significant
information is harder to obtain, as measured through the
genomic privacy metric, and we show that linkage attacks are
prevented when levels are splitted across several clouds.
2http://www.humangenomeprivacy.org/2017/
B. Sensitivity levels
We now describe how to create the different sensitivity
levels to prevent privacy leak amplifications, namely using
promotions of genomic variations across levels.
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Fig. 1. Initial sensitivity levels based on: (a) alleles frequency (quantitative
classification); and (b) manual declarations (qualitative classification).
a) Qualitative and quantitative sensitivity levels: In this
manuscript we propose the creation of sensitivity levels that
allow the differentiation of genomic data and basically can be
a combination of two different methods: manual declaration
(qualitative), or based on frequencies in a reference population
(quantitative). In the first case, a system administrator defines
the sensitivity levels based on how he perceives the sensitivity
of the information a variation reveals. Sensitive levels based on
frequencies, as we propose in this manuscript, are built on the
fact that a rare disease/genetic variation should be considered
more sensitive than a common one, since they concern a
smaller subset of the population. In particular, alleles whose
frequencies are lower than 0.05 should always be considered
highly sensitive, since they can lead to a restricted group of
individuals [39].
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Fig. 2. Alleles promotion across sensitivity levels based on linkage disequi-
librium (LD).
Figure 1a shows, as an example, a distribution of genomic
variations in three sensitivity levels, based on the frequency of
the alleles in the genome. In this figure, level 1 contains the
alleles whose frequency goes up to 0.05, level 2 is composed
of the alleles whose frequency is comprised between 0.05 and
0.2, and level 3 holds the remaining more common alleles.
Later in the results section, we discuss the distribution of the
alleles among different possible sensitivity levels. Differently,
Figure 1b presents three sensitivity levels based on information
coded in the genome and their severity when leaked. For level
1 we consider information such as disease genes, ethnicity-
related variants and other regions that can lead to individual’s
re-identification. In this article, we focus on quantitative levels,
and leave the implementation of qualitative levels for future
work.
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b) Sensitivity level promotion through LD connections:
Linkage disequilibrium (LD) describes the non-random trans-
mission of genomic variations. These non-random associations
have been used in privacy attacks [6]. We compute the LD
between two genomic variations if they are located at a
maximum distance of 1000 bases. Figure 2a illustrates how we
prevent adversaries from using LDs to infer genomic variations
through sensitivity levels. As an example, we show a variation
1 linked with variation 3, which is in turn linked to variation 6.
In this case, we have direct inference connections between all
the three sensitivity levels. For example, an adversary obtaining
the variation 3 would be able to infer the variations 1 and 6. To
avoid such an attack, we promote variations 3 and 6 to level 1
(represented by the green arrows), which prevent the attacker
from obtaining all the variations (1, 3, and 6). Following this
procedure, we also promote variations 5 (linked to variation
2) and variations 7 and 8 (linked to variation 4) to level 2.
c) Sensitivity level promotion through haplotypes in-
ference: To ensure that sensitivity levels are completely dis-
connected, we also use a haplotype inference software (e.g.,
MaCH [20]). Figure 2b shows how we processed in the case
of inference relations between variations. We run MaCH on
the SNPs from one sensitivity level to determine which SNPs
can be inferred with an r2 value higher than 0.3 (as recom-
mended by MaCH’s authors) from higher sensitivity levels.
The example in the figure shows that an adversary obtaining
the variations 9 and 10 would be able to infer variation 4.
Therefore, to prevent it we promote variations 9 and 10 to the
same level of variation 4. The software receives as input two
sets: (i) a list of the biomarkers and the SNPs information of a
reference population; and (ii) a list of the biomarkers and the
SNPs information the adversary can observe.
We perform the following steps for each sensitivity level:
Step 1. We start by creating sets of four files based on
all subsets of 20k SNPs from Chr. 1, available in the 1000
Genomes Project. We believe this number to be large enough,
since the correlation of SNPs decreases with their distance. The
first two files details the set of genotypes the adversary uses as
reference. The second set of files details the genomic variations
the adversary can observe at a given sensitivity level (through
an hypothetic attack) and does not contain the more sensitive
SNPs, which would be located in a secure environment.
Step 2. We run MaCH with the input files, and obtain a list of
SNPs that can be inferred by an adversary with the provided
sets, i.e., masked SNPs that MaCH is able to discover with
good accuracy. We focus on the inference of more sensitive
SNPs, thus we ignore those that are inferred and belong to
the same sensitivity level. This step assesses the information
that can be inferred in case of information leakage from a
sensitivity level.
Step 3. From each of the inferred SNPs, we compute the top
10 most connected SNPs (through LD) that the adversary can
observe. We therefore remove at most 10 SNPs per inferred
SNP at each iteration.
Step 4. We remove the 10 most related SNPs from the initial
adversary set, and move then to the higher sensitivity level,
since they allow the inference of more sensitive SNPs. We
then reiterate the whole process, starting from Step 1 using
the newly obtained input files, until no more inferences are
possible, or their number stabilizes.
Figure 2b provides an illustration of the inference iteration
process using MaCH after alleles in strong direct LD have
been promoted. In this example, from the genomic variations
contained in sensitivity level 3 (created during step 1), MaCH
tries to infer more sensitive genomic variations (step 2). After
inference, MaCH infers that the genomic variation numbered
4, which is in level 2, can be inferred with good accuracy
from those in level 3. Our code would then identify that the
genomic variations numbered 7 and 8 in level 3 are strongly
associated with the one numbered 4 in level 2 (Step 3). Those
two genomic variations would then be promoted to level 2
(Step 4), before iterating the inference process.
C. Classifying sensitive reads and adapted treatment
In this section, we first recall how sensitive reads (i.e., reads
that carry sensitive personally identifiable information (PII))
can be detected thanks to a filtering method first presented by
Cogo et al. [9]. We then extend this method to classify reads
into several sensitivity levels depending on the magnitude of
the impending privacy risk – the probability of an adversary
extracting PII, and the resulting negative impact. Finally, we
explain how to solve possible detection conflicts when using
several filters.
Reads filter. We briefly introduce the reads filtering
method [9], [34] and how we can use it to classify reads into
a scale of sensitivity levels. The reads filters are implemented
using Bloom filters, which are high throughput data structures
that can produce false positives, but never false negatives.
In addition, the filters are not a bottleneck when used in
combination with sequencing machines, as they are always
at least 40 times faster than current NGS machines, and they
are parallelizable. The filters are initialized from a database
of reads known to carry sensitive information. This sensitive
information includes, but is not limited to, all existing data
that have been used in the literature that describe attacks to re-
identify subjects of experiments. Such attacks have been based
on three kinds of sensitive sequences: (i) genomic variations
(including SNPs and SVs), (ii) disease genes and (iii) short
tandem repeats (STRs) – a known small string that appears
several times contiguously in a subject’s DNA, and whose
repetition numbers vary among a population.
Classification into sensitivity levels. We use one short
read filter per sensitivity level that we have previously identi-
fied, to prevent amplification attacks. To build the dictionary of
sensitive levels, we collect all genomic variations in the corre-
sponding disconnected sensitivity levels, and create all possible
short genomic sequences that contain them, relying on the
genomic variations database and the reference genome. Each
of those sequences is then finally inserted into a Bloom filter,
which is then ready to filter sequences. Figure 3 illustrates
our filtering approach, which classifies reads according to their
sensitivity level. The filtering approach is done in two steps:
sensitivity-aware filtering, and conflict management, which is
required when a read matches in several filters. After the
sequencing step, the reads are given as input to the sensitivity-
aware filtering step, made of Bloom filters initialized with
several disconnected groups of genomic variations. Finally, the
conflict management step combines the output of the filters to
determine the sensitivity of reads. It is then possible to adapt
the storage, computation, and use of a read according to the
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Fig. 3. Classification of reads in sensitivity levels and adjusted storage,
algorithms, and access control per sensitivity level.
security it requires. As represented in Figure 3, storage costs
and access limitations per read tend to increase with the sensi-
tivity of reads, while alignment performance tends to decrease.
Specific numbers depend on the available infrastructures and
on design choices. To prevent the linkage of a set of reads to
a disease, we randomly distribute the reads of each sensitivity
level among several clouds.
Filters conflict management. Bloom filters may produce
a controlled number of false positives, which in our case
may cause privacy leaks if they are not correctly managed.
Handling false positives is part of the conflict management
step represented on Figure 3, and works as follows. If a read
matches in several sensitivity level filters, we set its sensitivity
to the level of the most sensitive filter it matches to.
D. Read alignment: Performance × Privacy optimization
We finally show that the performance × privacy product
of reads alignment is improved when adapting the alignment
algorithms used, along with their execution environment, de-
pending on the detected sensitivity of the reads as soon as
the public cloud is at least as powerful as the private cloud.
More specifically, to align reads depending on their detected
sensitivity levels, DNA-SeAl aligns the most sensitive reads
in the private cloud (using CloudBurst [27]), and the least
sensitive reads in the public cloud (using CloudBurst [27]). De-
pending on the scenario studied, possibly remaining reads can
be aligned either in the private cloud (using CloudBurst [27])
or in the public cloud (using Chen et al.’s protocol [31]),
depending on which cloud finishes first.
We study the resulting performance improvement of our
approach over standard alignment strategies:
• Private clouds only. A biocenter relies entirely on its private
secure infrastructure to align reads using unsecure algorithm.
• Public clouds only. Alignment is performed in a non-secure
environment where an adversary may observe unencrypted
computations and communications. Therefore, sensitive reads
are aligned with proven or believed secure algorithms, while
more efficient algorithms are used with low sensitivity reads.
• Sensitivity-adapted private and public clouds alignment.
High-sensitivity and low-sensitivity reads are aligned in private
and public clouds, respectively. This scenario makes a rational
usage of a biocenter’ computing resources for the sensitive
computations, extended by a secure usage of public clouds.
III. RESULTS
A. Sensitivity levels statistics
We studied the average proportion of a subject’s SNPs in
each sensitivity level before and after SNPs promotion through
haplotype inference. Figure 4a represents the proportion of ge-
nomic variations of a subject in each sensitivity level before the
promotions. Level 1 contains a minority of alleles (3%), level 2
contains only 2% of the alleles, and the remaining 95% lies in
level 3. The genomic variations promotion slightly change the
distribution among the sensitivity levels, as Figure 4b shows. In
this case level 1 is the smallest one with 3%, level 2 slightly
increases with now 7% of the alleles, and the last, level 3,
contains 90% of the alleles.
3% 7%
90%
3% 2%
95%
5%
23%
72%
SensitivityHigher
(c)(b)(a)
26%
14%60%
(d)
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Fig. 4. Evolution of the sensitivity levels through the alleles promotions: (a)
Initial proportion of an individual genomic variations (GVs) per sensitivity
level; (b) Proportion of an individual GVs per sensitivity level after promo-
tions; (c) Proportion of 100-bases reads per sensitivity level; (d) Proportion
of 1000-bases reads per sensitivity level.
B. SNPs promotion across sensitivity levels
After one iteration, we promoted 1.6% of the SNPs of
level 3 to level 2, and 18% of the SNPs of level 2 to level
1. Overall, we promoted 1.5% of all SNPs from one level to a
more sensitive one. We summarize the proportion of inferred
SNPs per sensitivity level after various rounds of promotion
iterations, in Table I. The promotions are made using the
method described in section II-B. After one inference iteration
with MaCH, very few genomic variations could still be inferred
(e.g., less than 5 SNPS with level 3). These inferences are
due to the limited number of genomes used in the 1000
Genomes project, and to specific individuals who had unique
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combinations of statistically unlinked SNPs (since they can
still be inferred after more iterations). We are confident that
inferring those few SNPs in a larger population would not be
possible because the number of unique combinations of several
SNPs would be rarer.
Promotion iterations 0 1 2 3 4 5
Inferred SNPs (%) 9.97 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05from level 2 to level 1
Inferred SNPs (%) 0.43 0.30 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.04from level 3 to level 2
TABLE I. NUMBER OF INFERRED SNPS PER INFERENCE AND
PROMOTION.
C. Reads classification in sensitivity levels
Figure 4c shows the classification of 100-bases reads in
each sensitivity level. This distribution is somewhat different
from the distribution of the genomic variations. Level 1, which
is the most sensitive level, only contains 5% of the reads, while
level 2 contains 23% of the reads, and the remaining 72% of
the reads are classified into level 3. Level 3 continues to hold
the majority of the information which support the performance
and privacy optimization we discuss in next section. Figure 4d
shows that 60% of the 1000-bases reads are classified into
level 3, while 14% are in level 2, and the remaining 26% are
in level 1. The overall sensitivity of long reads is higher, since,
on average, they contain more SNPs.
D. Privacy evaluation
We evaluated the increased privacy protection that the use
of sensitivity levels can bring to genomic data using two
metrics: the genomic privacy metric, and the Likelihood Ratio
(LR) value. Genomic privacy represents the weighted risk of
re-identification based on adversary estimates for the minor
allele of observed SNPs. For this metric, low values indicate
high privacy [40]. The LR value represents the upper bound
power for the detection of an individual in a case group [41].
Fig. 5 shows the genomic privacy values for individual
HG03556 computed on its alleles for each sensitivity level
and per chromosome. The most sensitive level (red line) has
high genomic privacy values for all chromosomes (mainly
between 7.5×104 and 7.5×105), and it represents the largest
contribution to an individual’s genomic privacy value. The
values for the intermediary level (orange line) are comprised
between 3.0× 104 and 2.0× 105, and the least sensitive level
(blue line) is evaluated at less than 105. This experiment shows
that the SNPs increasingly participate in the genomic privacy
metric as they are classified more sensitive. We observed
the same pattern on the complete 1000 Genomes Project
population.
We then evaluated the LR-test metric on the case and
control individuals considering 2,014,777 SNP sites. Overall,
depending on the subject, level 1 contained 130,000–158,000
alleles, level 2 contained 111,000–125,000 alleles, and level
3 contained 1,733,000–1,773,000 alleles. We randomly par-
titioned each sensitivity level such that no individual could
be identified as being part of the case population from any
partition’s subset. Our experiments indicate that splitting levels
1 and 2 in half (i.e., 50% subsets), and level 3 in five (i.e.,
20% subsets) would prevent any successful linkage. We ran
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Fig. 5. Genomic privacy per sensitivity level for individual HG03556.
each experiment 20 times with all 1,000 case and 1,000 control
genomes.
Fig. 6 shows the distribution of the LR-test values for
the full sensitivity levels and for random subsets of the
sensitivity levels. In this figure, we denote the case population
as ca and the control population as co. The numbers in the
figure represent the proportion of case individuals that can
be identified without false positives. Using the full genomic
information, 31.3% of the case individuals could be linked
with the disease. Based on the full sensitivity levels, 32.9%
(i.e., 329 individuals), 6.2% and 3.7% of the case individuals
could be linked with the disease based on the information
contained in levels 1, 2 and 3, respectively. We then partitioned
the per-subject levels until no case individual could be linked
with the disease based on any partition subset. Dividing levels
1 and 2 in half (50%) was sufficient to achieve this goal, while
level 3 required to be partitioned in five (20%). This result
experimentally shows that randomly partitioning levels of reads
allows the processing of sets of variants while preventing
linkage attacks.
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E. Performance × Privacy product optimization
Aligning reads in a cloud implies assuming that the cloud
provider is trustful, and that the cloud will not be attacked. We
do not make these risky assumptions, and therefore rely on the
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following three categories of alignment algorithms, which we
previously introduced in Section I, to optimize the performance
× privacy product using sensitivity levels. Category (i) – non-
secure but fast algorithms: we use Cloudburst [27], which
is an unprotected method, and requires 0.4 CPU seconds,
respectively 0.41 CPU seconds if reads are encrypted for the
transfer to the cloud server. Category (ii) – secure but slow
cryptographic algorithms: we use a homomorphic encryption
based approach [42], which requires 22 CPU days. Category
(iii) – algorithms providing an intermediate level of protection:
we use a protocol based on hashing k-mers presented in [31],
which is much more efficient, requiring only 1.3 CPU seconds.
However, it may leak information about equal k-mers and has
not been formally proven secure. Table II summarizes our
analysis of the privacy level, computation cost (CPU hours)
and communication (bytes) cost of aligning a single 100 base-
pairs read to the full human genome, using a single core.
Method Privacy Computation Communication
(Sec. II-C) (CPU time) volume
Homom. encr. [42] Very high 22.08 days 3.75×108 KB
Hashed k-mers [31] High 1.3 sec. 5.22 KB
Cloudburst [27] Low 0.41 sec. 2.3 KB
TABLE II. PRIVACY, PERFORMANCE AND COMMUNICATION
OVERHEADS OF THE ALIGNMENT ALGORITHMS WE USE.
Table III lists situations with different relative proportions
of public cloud’s computing power over the private cloud com-
puting’s power. For example, configuration 1/10 means that
the public clouds are 10 times more powerful than the private
cloud. Under each configuration we evaluate the performance
of a read alignment for the three possible cases: (i) on the
public cloud only (using 5PM [42]); (ii) on the private cloud
only (using CloudBurst [27]); or (iii) on both the private cloud
for sensitive reads (using CloudBurst [27] and on the public
clouds for non-sensitive reads (using 5PM [42]).
Proportion
Our approach
Previous approaches
Pub./Pri. Pub [42] Priv [27] Pub. [42]/Pri. [27]with [9]
Time (3× 108s) (0.41s) (0.29s)
1/1 0.29s 106x 1.39x 1x (0.29s)
2/1 0.097s 106x 4.20x 1.51x (0.11s)
10/1 0.019s 106x 20x 5.85x (0.11s)
Data Transfers (16.8GB) (2.3KB) (1.6KB)
1/1 1.6KB 107x 1.39x 1x (1.6KB)
2/1 0.55KB 107x 4.20x 1.51x (0.83KB)
10/1 0.11KB 107x 20x 5.85x (0.65KB)
TABLE III. OVERHEADS OF EXISTING PRIVACY-PRESERVING
ALIGNMENT APPROACHES COMPARED TO DNA-SeAl’S, DEPENDING ON
THE RATIO OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE CLOUDS.
Overall, we can draw the following conclusions about
privacy-preserving alignment of a read: (i) it is not practical
to rely only on a public cloud to align reads with crypto-
graphically secure algorithms (3 × 108 seconds per CPU per
read); (ii) relying on a private cloud with cleartext alignment
is the fastest solution (0.41 seconds per CPU), but it does
not scale; (iii) by classifying reads as either sensitive or non-
sensitive, performance can be improved whenever a public
cloud, assumed to be as least as powerful as the private cloud,
is available (starting at 0.29s with [9]); and (iv) our approach,
relying on more than two sensitivity levels, further improves
performance on hybrid clouds (down to 0.019s with a public
cloud ten times more powerful than the private cloud). Similar
conclusions can be taken in terms of memory consumption.
To summarize our approach, in a nutshell, and compared to
previous works, by using sensitivity levels to align reads,
we remove computational tasks from the secure alignment
performance bottleneck (i.e., the private cloud alignment), and
execute them securely in public clouds.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this manuscript we presented DNA-SeAl, which makes
the following contributions:
• We proposed a methodology to create sensitivity levels for
unaligned reads. Our methodology allows sensitive levels to
be defined based on both qualitative and quantitative aspects.
The levels declared qualitatively are based on the biological
insights a sequence reveals, while the levels declared quantita-
tively are based on the frequency of carried genomic variations
in a population. We based our experiments on quantitative
levels only, for simplicity, since qualitative levels are both
subjective and of relatively small size.
• We found out that leakage across levels exist due to haplo-
type inference (using LD relations), and showed that promoting
groups of linked genomic variations to the highest of their
sensitivity levels prevent such leakages.
• We extended the short reads filter proposed by Cogo et al. [9]
to automatically classify reads into the multiple sensitivity
levels (i.e., not just based on a binary answer).
• We defined a read alignment method that relies on a clas-
sification of reads into sensitivity levels, which improves over
the state-of-the art alignment methods in terms of performance
while providing adequate security guarantees.
Filtering limitations. The filter cannot detect genomic vari-
ations it was not initialized with (e.g. de novo SNPs).
However, new genomic variations are now more rarely
discovered [9], which limits the residual risk of not detecting
sensitive nucleotides. Moreover, the filters can be very easily
updated to include newly discovered genomic variations. In a
production system, this would be as straight forward as anti-
virus update schemes today.
Parameters. We define three sensitivity levels, however,
this number can be extended as more diverse algorithms
and execution environments are available. Relying on more
levels can increase: i) performance while maintaining a given
security; or ii) security while maintaining a given performance.
We made practical choices concerning the parameters of our
methods. During the SNP promotions based on LD, we used
20,000 as a maximal distance between SNPs during LD
computations, which provides a good accuracy, since most
of the reported haplotype blocks in humans are smaller than
20Kbases [43]. During the inference step, which relies on
MaCH, we promoted, during each inference iteration, the 10
SNPs the most connected to an inferred SNP. Promoting less
SNPs per iteration would result in less promotions overall but
would take a larger number of iterations. In future work, we
will consider refining the sensitivity levels based on ethnicities.
V. CONCLUSION
In this manuscript, we proposed a novel approach to
classify genomic data in multiple incremental sensitivity lev-
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els. We explained how to disconnect these levels based on
LD relations, and how to prevent attacks amplification. We
showed that such classification leverages the complementary
characteristics of different alignment algorithms, if selectively
applied to subsets of the data reads, guided by such a risk-
aware sensitivity classification, taking the best of each al-
gorithm (performance or security). Our approach, DNA-SeAl,
improves on the state of the art in terms of privacy ×
performance product, taking into account the computation time
and communication cost to the clouds. Furthermore, DNA-SeAl
is suitable for different levels and different algorithms, even
as new algorithms appear. We presented an implementation
with multiple filters that efficiently and automatically classify
unaligned reads in privacy-sensitivity levels. This filtering
approach allows adjusting the protection of reads of different
levels, with incremental performance gains resulting in an
optimized and stable privacy × performance product. We show
that the filtering approach can be combined with existing
alignment methods (either cleartext, hybrid, cryptographic).
We believe DNA-SeAl to be timely, presenting a necessary
tradeoff between perfect security and performance, since the
growth in genomics data production pushes biocenters to rely
on public clouds, and since the performance of cryptographic
approaches is not sufficient to be massively used. Finally, DNA-
SeAl’s classification reduces the future re-identification risks
and the partition of the levels prevents linkage attacks.
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